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Abstract
The present research examines how a single behaviour that is informative of both
the morality and intelligence of a person influences impressions, degree of cooperative
behaviour expected from that person, and degree of cooperative behaviour displayed
toward that person in a mixed-motive interdependence situation (i.e., a social dilemma).
Furthermore, it is investigated how individual dierences in social value orientation
influence these processes. Participants were provided with behavioural information that
could be construed in terms of both morality (high/low) and intelligence (high/low).
Consistent with the morality-importance hypothesis, participants assigned greater
weight to morality than to intelligence aspects of the information. Congruent with the
social value orientation hypothesis (i) only proselfs and not prosocials expected more
cooperation from unintelligent than from intelligent others, and (ii) prosocials attended
more strongly to morality aspects than proselfs in deciding on own cooperation. Finally,
consistent with the relative benefit hypothesis, people overall expected more cooperation
than they were willing to display, and this tendency was especially pronounced with
others described by moral/unintelligent behaviour, and for people with a proself value
orientation. The authors discuss a model describing influences of the perceiver and the
perceived on cooperative behaviour. Copyright # 1999 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
INTRODUCTION
A person’s behaviour is often informative of more than one aspect of his or her
personality. Therefore, dierent perceivers may construe the same behaviour of a
person in very dierent ways. Consider, for instance, somebody who is willing to do
tedious overtime work again and again for a boss who does not reward this behaviour
in terms of additional payments or enhanced career prospects. Some people may
regard this person as very noble, being intrinsically concerned with the well-being of
her co-workers or the organization as a whole. Others, however, may consider her
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quite stupid for investing in a situation without perspectives. In everyday life, we
typically encounter situations in which the information we receive about other people
is multi-interpretable. The way in which behavioural information is interpreted will
then depend on both the behaviour of the perceived and the personality of the
perceiver. The present research focuses on the way in which these two factors influ-
ence the interpretation of behavioural information, as well as the way in which the
resulting impression guides the perceiver’s expectations regarding future behaviour of
the perceived, and the perceiver’s behaviour toward the perceived.
Three assumptions underlie this research. The first is that, in everyday life, people
generally form impressions of each other based on observed behaviour, and that this
type of information about a person is often multi-interpretable. Our current focus
in this respect is on the well-known dimensions of social and intellectual desirability
(see e.g. Rosenberg, Nelson and Vivekananthan, 1968; Rosenberg and Sedlak, 1972),
or morality and intelligence1. So, when observing behaviour that is indicative of
both the actor’s morality and intelligence, people will have to make an implicit
judgment of the relative importance of these aspects. Generally, this multi-inter-
pretability has not received much attention in research on the way people form
impressions from behaviour. The vast majority of prior impression formation studies
has used undimensional behavioural descriptions, indicative of either another person’s
morality (e.g. ‘gave back extra change at the supermarket’) or another person’s
intelligence (e.g. ‘spoke four dierent languages fluently’; Skowronski and Carlston,
1987; see also e.g. Coovert and Reeder, 1990; Reeder and Coovert, 1986; Wojciszke,
Brycz and Borkenau, 1993; an exception, however, is Wojciszke, 1994). The present
research complements this literature by describing target persons in terms of behaviour
that can be interpreted simultaneously in terms of both morality and intelligence.
Our second assumption is that perceivers are more likely to dier in their
interpretation and use of behavioural information to the extent that such information
is interpretable in dierent ways, as the possibility for dierent interpretations leaves
room for individual dierences to influence these processes. The assumption that our
impression of others might be as informative about ourselves as it is about the other
person (cf. Bruner, 1957) is widely shared among personality and social psychologists.
To our knowledge, however, it has received little empirical attention. We explicitly
investigate the influence of individual dierences.
Finally, our third assumption is that people do not form impressions in a
vacuum—they do so for a reason. In most interpersonal situations, people are
dependent on others for some goal they seek to attain, and they have to interact with
these others to try to do so. Impressions of others can be helpful in deciding what
behaviour to expect from others, and how to behave oneself (cf. Fiske, 1992).
Specifically, we investigated inferences people draw from behavioural information in
an interactive situation in which people are dependent on one another, and in which
they have the option to choose between pursuing self-interest or collective interest—a
mixed-motive interdependence situation. Many interpersonal situations share
features of mixed-motive interdependence. For example, when working on a project
1We are of the opinion that the dimensions of social and intellectual desirability represent more than just
morality and intelligence. Our notion is that the first dimension represents traits and behaviours that are
socially good or bad (or other-profitable, see Peeters and Czapinski, 1990), whereas the second dimension
represents competence-related (or self-profitable) traits and behaviours. However, in the present research
we operationalized these dimensions as morality and intelligence, respectively.
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with a colleague, it is often tempting to leave the most tedious parts of the job for the
other person to do. However, if you both act this way, the project is unlikely to make
much progress. A feature of this type of situation is that it provides no clues on
whether to view the other as a ‘partner’ or as an ‘opponent’. Therefore, it is useful to
form an impression of the other person and of the behaviour one may expect from
him or her, in order to decide how to behave toward this person.
The aim of our current study was threefold. First, we intended to demonstrate that,
apart from perceiver influences, morality aspects of behavioural information are
generally more important than intelligence aspects in terms of predictive utility
(Sherman, Judd and Park, 1989); that is, attending to morality aspects of information
about another person is more useful than attending to intelligence aspects
(cf. Wojciszke, 1994; Wojciszke, Bazinska and Joworski, 1998). Second, we examined
how individual dierences in social value orientation (i.e. prosocial versus individual-
istic and competitive orientation, McClintock, 1972) would influence inferences
drawn from morality and intelligence information. Third, we investigated how the
dierences between levels of expected and own cooperation varied with characteristics
of the perceiver and the perceived.
The importance of morality
Previous research has demonstrated that when people think about others, they
give more attention and weight to these others’ morality rather than intelligence
characteristics (Wojciszke, 1994; 1997; Wojciszke et al., 1998). We complement this
research by investigating the importance of morality in an interaction context. This is
all the more important, because explanations for the relative importance of morality
unambiguously rely on interaction (and interdependence) between people. First,
morality can be defined as a sense of obligation toward others and the absence of
anpintention to harm others (cf. Deutsch, 1982; Van Lange and Kuhlman, 1994).
Therefore, expectations of cooperativeness can be drawn more easily from morality
than from intelligence information, as morality aspects are indicative of a person’s
trustworthiness. Second, morality information is explicitly interpersonal in nature.
The positive or negative consequences for others of a person’s dispositional
(im)morality are very clear (Wojciszke et al., 1993; see also the concept of other-
profitability of Peeters and Czapinski, 1990). So, another person’s morality tells you
more about probable behaviour toward you than his or her intelligence. In sum, the
morality of the perceived is both salient and relevant for the perceiver (cf. Wojciszke,
1994; Wojciszke et al., 1998). Accordingly, we predicted that in a mixed-motive
interdependence situation people will attend more strongly to the other person’s
morality than to his or her intelligence, resulting in stronger eects for morality than
for intelligence on global impressions, and on levels of expected cooperation and
cooperation displayed (morality-importance hypothesis).
Individual dierences in social value orientation
A second purpose of the current research is to investigate the way in which predictive
utility assigned to morality versus intelligence aspects diers with the perceiver’s
personality—more specifically, with his or her social value orientation (McClintock,
1972). People have been found to dier systematically in the weight they assign to
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outcomes for themselves and others. Generally, three types of social value orientation
are distinguished (cf. Deutsch, 1960). First, prosocials value outcomes for both self
and others positively. They will be motivated to strive for the best outcomes for all
persons involved, and to minimize the dierences between outcomes for self and
others. Second, individualists only assign positive value to their own outcomes, and
try to obtain the best outcomes for themselves. Finally, competitors assign positive
value to their own outcomes and negative value to others’ outcomes, and seek to
obtain better outcomes than others. These three orientations have been found to be
stable over time (Kuhlman, Camac and Cunha, 1986; McClintock and Allison, 1989),
and predictive of behaviour in a variety of social situations (i.e. in social dilemma
experiments, e.g. Kuhlman and Marshello, 1975; Liebrand, 1984; Liebrand and
McClintock, 1988; Van Lange, 1992, as well as in everyday life, e.g. helping
behaviour, McClintock and Allison, 1989; donation, Van Lange and Schuyt, 1997;
see also Van Lange, Otten, De Bruin and Joireman, 1997).
People with dierent social value orientations dier not only in the levels of
cooperative behaviour they display (and expect from others), but also in the way in
which they interpret mixed-motive interdependence situations, or social dilemmas
(see e.g. Kuhlman, Brown and Teta, 1992; Liebrand, Jansen, Rijken and Suhre, 1986;
Sattler and Kerr, 1991; Van Lange and Liebrand, 1991a). Prosocials view a
mixed-motive situation in terms of collective rationality and morality: they consider
it good, and, from a collective viewpoint, rational to cooperate. Individualists and
competitors, on the other hand, view a mixed-motive situation in terms of individual
rationality and intelligence: they believe that non-cooperation is the intelligent,
rational thing to do. Hence, prosocials interpret the (non)cooperative behaviour of an
interdependent other in terms of morality, whereas individualists and competitors
interpret the same behaviour in terms of intelligence (see e.g. Liebrand et al., 1986;
Van Lange and Kuhlman, 1994). Accordingly, prosocials have been found to assign
more weight to personality test information about another person’s morality rather
than intelligence—even to the extent that they do not even use intelligence information
when morality information is also present (Van Lange and Kuhlman, 1994).
Individualists and competitors, on the other hand, have been found to assign more
weight to personality test information about another person’s intelligence. It has not
been investigated, however, whether these dierences would persist were people
provided with multi-interpretable behavioural information, instead of clear-cut
information about a person’s dispositional level of morality or intelligence according
to a (bogus) personality test.
Overall, these dierences primarily distinguish prosocials from individualists and
competitors. Therefore, in the current study, we combined individualists and
competitors into a group labelled proself (for identical procedures, see Van Lange
and Liebrand, 1989). We predicted that, when confronted with behavioural informa-
tion that is interpretable in terms of both morality and intelligence, prosocials would
attend more to the morality dimension, leading to stronger morality eects for
prosocials than for proselfs on expected and own cooperation. Also, we predicted that
proselfs would attend more to the intelligence dimension, leading to stronger
intelligence eects for proselfs than for prosocials on these measures (social value
orientation hypothesis).
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Relative benefit
Our third and final purpose was to explore how dierences between expected and own
cooperation would vary with characteristics of the perceiver and the perceived. We
expected that people would expect higher levels of cooperation from others than they
would be willing to display themselves—‘just to be on the safe side’. This deviation
from reciprocity has received empirical support in previous research (e.g. Van Lange
and Semin-Goossens, 1998). We will refer to this dierence between expected and
own cooperation as relative benefit. Our aim was to investigate whether relative benefit
would be especially large with some targets or with some perceivers.
First, regarding influences of the perceived on relative benefit, we expected that
relative benefit would be largest for moral and unintelligent targets2. People would
expect high levels of cooperation from these targets because of their morality. At the
same time, we anticipated that people would be less inclined to reciprocate these high
levels of cooperation with moral/unintelligent than with moral/intelligent others:
people would form a more negative global impression of the former, or they would
consider them as unable to retaliate3. Second, regarding influences of the perceiver on
relative benefit, we expected that relative benefit would be larger overall for proselfs
than for prosocials, because the latter are generally more inclined to reciprocate levels
of expected cooperation (see e.g. De Dreu and McCusker, 1997; Van Lange, Agnew,
Harinck and Steemers, 1997). Moreover, we expected that influences of the perceiver
and the perceived on relative benefit would interact. As proselfs associate lack of
intelligence with cooperative behaviour, they are likely to expect high levels of
cooperation from moral/unintelligent targets not only because of their morality, but
also because of their lack of intelligence. So, proselfs may expect even higher levels of
cooperation frommoral/unintelligent others than would prosocials. At the same time,
they would be less inclined to reciprocate. Therefore, we expected that the large relative
benefit with moral/unintelligent others would be especially pronounced for proselfs.
Research design and overview of hypotheses
We first assessed participants’ social value orientation. Next, participants were
successively paired with a number of other persons in a social dilemma task,
representing a conflict between one’s own interest and collective interest. Participants
received behavioural information (either moral/intelligent, moral/unintelligent,
immoral/intelligent, or immoral/unintelligent) about these persons.
To summarize, we advanced the following hypotheses. First, we expected the
morality aspects of behavioural information to have stronger eects on global
impressions, and on levels of expected cooperation and cooperation displayed, than
the intelligence aspects (morality-importance hypothesis). Second, we expected that
dierences in social value orientation would influence the way in which information is
2For reasons of eciency, we will refer to targets described by moral/intelligent (moral/unintelligent, etc)
behaviour as moral/intelligent (moral/unintelligent, etc) targets throughout the text. We would like to
remind the reader that, although we use the term target for reasons of convenience, the targets in the
current study are not stimulus persons in the classic meaning. Instead, they are perceived as interacting with
the perceiver/participant.
3In the task employed in the current study, there were no opportunities for retaliation. However, we assume
that in everyday social situations, people learn to associate the lack of intelligence of a person with his or
her incapacity to pursue his or her own interests. Such associations may facilitate the implicit or explicit
decision to take advantage of moral/unintelligent people.
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used for deriving expectations and deciding on own behaviour. We predicted (i) that
prosocials would attend more to the morality dimension, leading to stronger morality
eects for prosocials than for proselfs on expected and own cooperation, and (ii) that
proselfs would attend more to the intelligence dimension, leading to stronger
intelligence eects for proselfs than for prosocials on these measures (social value
orientation hypothesis). Finally, we expected that relative benefit would be largest with
moral/unintelligent others, especially for proselfs (relative benefit hypothesis).
METHOD
Participants and design
Participants were 164 students at the Free University of Amsterdam, recruited by
means of an advertisement in the university newspaper. The design included social
value orientation (prosocial versus proself) as a between-participant factor, and
morality of other (moral versus immoral) and intelligence of other (intelligent versus
unintelligent) as within-participant factors.
Procedure
The experiment was run self-paced on personal computers in individual cubicles, and
was part of larger session that included multiple studies. First, participants’ social
value orientation was assessed. Next, the social dilemma task was explained. Partici-
pants then engaged in this two-person task with a number of (fictitious) target
persons successively, each described either by a moral and intelligent, an immoral and
intelligent, a moral and unintelligent, or an immoral and unintelligent behavioural
description. Finally, participants were debriefed and paid for participation.
Assessment of social value orientation
Participants’ social value orientation was assessed by means of a series of nine so-
called decomposed games, each involving a choice between a prosocial, an individual-
istic, and a competitive option. Consistent with prior research, people were classified
as prosocials, individualists, or competitors if they made at least six out of nine
choices consistent with one of these orientations (the decomposed games procedure is
discussed more extensively by Van Lange et al., 1997b). We identified 77 prosocials,
42 individualists, and 25 competitors. Twenty participants could not be classified.
This distribution resembles the distributions found in previous research using the
same or similar measures (e.g. McClintock and Allison, 1989; Van Lange and
Kuhlman, 1994). As noted earlier, we collapsed participants across individualists and
competitors, resulting in 77 prosocials (37 men, 40 women) and 67 proselfs (23 men,
44 women).
The decision making task
The mixed-motive interdependence situation was presented to participants in the
form of a decision making task. Participants were told that the study involved making
choices between options that would aect both the number of points they would
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receive and the number of points that another person would receive. They were told
that for every choice they made, they would be paired with another person, about
whom they would receive some information before they had to make their choices.
They received no information about the number of persons they would be paired
with.
The decision making task was adopted from prior research (Van Lange and
Kuhlman, 1994; Van Lange and Liebrand, 1991a; b). Participants were told that upon
each new pairing with a person, this person would have four yellow points, each of
which was worth 50 Dutch cents to him or her, but worth 100 Dutch cents to the
participant. They were told further that they themselves would have four blue points
upon each new pairing with a new person, each worth 50 Dutch cents to the
participant, but worth 100 Dutch cents to the order person. Instructions stated that
although the points represented money, the study would not involve additional
monetary payos. Participants were told that their task was to decide how many
points—none, one, two, three, or four—they would give to the other person. They
were also led to believe that the other person would decide how many points he or she
would give to them. It was stressed that every point transferred results in a 50c loss for
the giver and a 100c gain for the receiver. After a few calculation examples, partici-
pants were provided with a table containing the 5 5 payo matrix for the task,
displaying the outcomes for both themselves and the other person for all possible
combinations of own and other’s choices. Participants could consult this table
throughout the experiment. Additionally, a ten-item questionnaire to check partici-
pants’ comprehension of the task was administered, the results of which showed that
all participants comprehended the task structure.4 Following explanation and
comprehension check, it was repeated that upon each pairing with a new person the
participant would again have four blue points, and the other person four yellow
points.
Half of the participants first engaged in the social dilemma task with all targets
successively, and thereafter rated their global impression of all targets successively.
The other half rated their global impression of a target, engaged in the social dilemma
task with this target, and then went on to the next target. Preliminary analyses showed
no consistent pattern of eects for order, so this variable will not be further discussed.
Manipulation of morality and intelligence
Participants were told that they would receive information about recent behaviour of
the persons with whom they would be paired, by noting that such information may
facilitate decision making. They were also told that the other persons would not
receive any information about the participant. The behavioural descriptions were
selected from a two-step pretest study. A first group of eight people were asked to
generate examples of behaviours that were either (a) moral and intelligent, (b) moral
and unintelligent, (c) immoral and intelligent, or (d) immoral and unintelligent. They
were asked to generate three behaviours of each category. The behaviours thus
generated were reformulated so that they had about equal word lengths. Next, we
asked a second group of 36 pretest participants to rate these behaviours. Specifically,
4Only one participant answered fewer than eight (namely six) out of these ten questions incorrectly. This
participant received an additional oral explanation of the task structure. Excluding this participant from
the analyses produced identical results; in the analysis reported here, the participant is included.
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they rated, first, to what the extent the behaviours were moral or immoral, and
intelligent or unintelligent. After this, they rated to what extent the behaviours were
informative of the person’s morality and intelligence (i.e. the diagnosticity of the
behaviours for morality and intelligence). All ratings were made on seven-point
scales. Pretest participants of this second group were told that all behaviours had been
observed among dierent persons. The order in which the descriptions were presented
was randomized for each pretest participant. Also, the behaviours rated by half of
these pretest participants were displayed by male actors; the other half rated the same
behaviours displayed by female actors. Gender of actor had no eects on the pretest
ratings. From this pretest, we selected two behaviours from each category that scored
higher than 4 on both seven-point diagnosticity scales, and either higher than 5 or
lower than 3 on the scales for morality and intelligence. For instance, the moral/
unintelligent behaviours scored higher than 4 on diagnosticity for morality and
diagnosticity for intelligence, higher than 5 on the morality scale, and lower than 3 on
the intelligence scale. The behaviours used are listed in the appendix.
In the main study, participants were shown one of these behaviours per target
person, and were led to believe that this target had displayed the behaviour last week.
Participants were paired with eight targets, two in each category. The order in which
the targets were presented was randomized for each participant. We also system-
atically varied target gender. First, half of the targets were male and the other half
were female. Furthermore, counterbalanced with other variations, half of the targets
that were male in one version, were female in the other version, and vice versa.
Preliminary analyses showed no consistent pattern of eects including target gender
version; these variables will not be further discussed.
Dependent measures
Participants were asked how many points—none, one, two, three, or four—they
expected the other person to give to them (expected cooperation), and how many
points—none, one, two, three, or four—they gave to the target (own cooperation).
Also, they rated their global impression of the target on a five-point scale (ÿ2, very
negative; 2, very positive).
RESULTS
For all dependent measures—global impressions, expected cooperation, own
cooperation, and relative benefit—mean scores were computed across the two targets
per category. These means are displayed in Table 1. The data were analysed by means
of a series of analyses of variance, with social value orientation (prosocial versus
proself) and participant gender (male versus female) as between-participant factors,
and morality (moral versus immoral) and intelligence (intelligent versus unintelligent)
of the targets as within-participant factors. The results of these analyses will be
discussed below. 5
5Apart from the eects discussed in the text, we also found eects including participant gender, suggesting
that the morality dimension was more important for women than for men, which is consistent with
previous research by Wojciszke (1994; Wojciszke et al., 1998). First, we found an interaction between
morality and gender on global impressions, F (1,140) 9.47, p5 0.005. Whereas both men and women
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Morality-importance hypothesis
We expected that the morality aspects of the information would have stronger eects
on global impressions, and on levels of expected cooperation and cooperation
displayed, than the intelligence aspects. This prediction received strong support in
that morality main eects on these variables were stronger than intelligence main
eects.
First, for global impressions, we found main eects for morality, F(1, 140) 601.30,
p5 0.001, and intelligence, F(1, 140) 78.40, p5 0.001, as well as a morality by
intelligence interaction, F(1, 140) 4.58, p5 0.05. Overall, moral targets elicited
more favourable impressions than did immoral targets (M 0.78 versus Mÿ0.81,
SDs 0.40 and 0.51, respectively), and intelligent targets elicited more favourable
impressions than unintelligent targets (M 0.17 versus Mÿ0.20, SDs 0.36 and
0.33, respectively). A direct test of the morality-importance hypothesis showed that
the dierence between moral and immoral targets (a mean dierence of 1.56) was
more pronounced than the dierence between intelligent and unintelligent targets
(a mean dierence of 0.36), t(143) 15.61, p5 0.001. Furthermore, looking at the
means in Table 1, we observe that moral/unintelligent targets elicited more favourable
impressions than did immoral/intelligent targets. The behaviour of both was positive
in one respect and negative in another respect, so this means that greater weight is
given to morality than to intelligence. Finally, the pattern of the morality by
intelligence interaction shows that morality and intelligence strengthen each other’s
eects.
Table 1. Eects of morality and intelligence in full-factorial analyses of variance on global
impressions, expected cooperation, own cooperation, and relative benefit (i.e. the dierence
between expected and own cooperation).
Means
Moral/
intelligent
Moral/
unintelligent
Immoral/
intelligent
Immoral/
unintelligent
Global impressions 0.99d 0.55c ÿ0.65b ÿ0.93a
Expected cooperation 2.07b 2.61c 0.94a 0.89a
Own cooperation 1.84b 1.88b 0.74a 0.65a
Relative benefit 0.23a 0.73b 0.20a 0.23a
Note: Global impression ratings were made on five-point scales anchored ÿ2 and 2. Expected and own
cooperation and the dierences between them are in points, with a minimum of 0 and a maximum of 4.
Within a row, means with dierent subscripts are dierent at p5 0.01.
judged moral targets more favourably than immoral targets, this dierence was more pronounced for
women (0.82 versus ÿ0.89) than for men (0.69 versus ÿ0.65). So, women judged both moral targets more
favourably (0.82 versus 0.69) and immoral targets less favourably (ÿ0.89 versus ÿ0.65) than did men.
Second, we found an interaction between morality and gender on cooperative behaviour, F (1,140) 8.65,
p5 0.005. Although both men and women displayed more cooperation toward moral targets than toward
immoral targets, this dierence was again more pronounced for women (1.94 versus 0.61) than for men
(1.75 versus 0.81). So, women both behaved more cooperatively toward moral targets (1.94 versus 1.75)
and less cooperatively toward immoral targets (0.61 versus 0.81) than did men. The only other eect
obtained was an unexpected four-way interaction between social value orientation, participant gender,
morality, and intelligence on the dierence between expected and own cooperation, F (1, 140) 4.34,
p5 0.05. As this interaction did not show any meaningful pattern, and because of the large number of
possible chance eects, this eect will not be further discussed.
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For levels of expected cooperation, we also found main eects for morality,
F(1, 140) 341.55, p5 0.001, and intelligence, F(1, 140) 18.99, p5 0.001, and a
morality by intelligence interaction, F(1, 140) 32.74, p5 0.001. Overall, higher
levels of cooperation were expected from moral than from immoral targets (M 2.34
versus M 0.91, SDs 0.84 and 0.80, respectively), and higher levels of cooperation
were expected from unintelligent targets than from intelligent targets (M 1.75
versus M 1.50, SDs 0.71 and 0.83, respectively). Again, we found that the overall
eect for morality was more pronounced than the eect for intelligence; that is, the
dierence between moral and immoral targets (a mean dierence of 1.42) was more
pronounced than the dierence between intelligent and unintelligent targets (a mean
dierence of 0.24), t(143) 13.28, p5 0.001. Moreover, as can be seen in Table 1, the
pattern of the interaction was such that the intelligence eect was significant only for
targets who displayed moral behaviour, and not for targets who displayed immoral
behaviour.
For levels of own cooperation, we only found a main eect for morality,
F(1, 140) 341.55, p5 0.001: moral targets elicited more cooperation than did
immoral targets (M 1.86 versus M 0.70, SDs 1.06 and 0.87). The main eect for
intelligence and the morality by intelligence interaction were not significant. Clearly,
then, morality had more impact than intelligence—that is, the dierence between
moral and immoral targets (a mean dierence of 1.16) was more pronounced than the
dierence between intelligent and unintelligent targets (a mean dierence of 0.02),
t(143) 12.28, p5 0.001. In sum, the morality aspects of the behavioural informa-
tion had stronger eects on global impressions, levels of expected cooperation, and
own cooperation than the intelligence aspects.
Individual dierences in social value orientation
We found a main eect for social value orientation on expected cooperation,
F(1, 140) 6.87, p5 0.02): prosocials expected greater levels of cooperation than did
proselfs (M 1.76 versus M 1.47, SDs 0.69 and 0.66). Furthermore, a main eect
for social value orientation on own cooperation, F(1, 140) 17.70, p5 0.001,
showed that prosocials also displayed higher levels of cooperation than did proselfs
(M 1.54 versus M 0.98, SDs 0.87 and 0.75). These eects are consistent with
previous research. More interesting, however, are the interactions between social
value orientation and morality, and between social value orientation and intelligence.
We expected, first, that prosocials would attend more to the morality aspects of the
information, leading to stronger morality eects for prosocials than for proselfs on
expected and own cooperation. The analyses revealed an interaction between social
value orientation and morality on levels of cooperation displayed toward the targets,
F(1,140) 6.85, p5 0.02. Both prosocials and proselfs displayed more cooperation
toward moral versus immoral targets; this dierence was much more pronounced
for prosocials (M 2.21 versus M 0.88, SDs 1.05 and 0.96, respectively) than for
proselfs (M 1.46 versus M 0.49, SDs 0.94 and 0.71, respectively; see Figure 1,
right panel). This is consistent with our hypothesis. The interaction between social
value orientation and morality on expected cooperation was not significant,
F(1, 140) 1.80, n.s.: prosocials and proselfs did not dier systematically in the way
they derived expectations from information regarding morality versus immorality. No
interaction was obtained between social value orientation and morality on global
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impressions; that is, individual dierences in social value orientation did not influence
the way in which participants formed global impressions of targets diering in
morality.
Second, we expected that proselfs would attend more strongly to intelligence
aspects, leading to stronger intelligence eects for proselfs than for prosocials on
expected and own cooperation.We found a significant interaction between social value
orientation and intelligence on levels of expected cooperation, F(1, 140) 12.76,
p5 0.001. Consistent with our hypothesis, proselfs expected more cooperation from
unintelligent than from intelligent targets (M 1.71 versus M 1.24, SDs 0.75 and
0.75), while prosocials did not make this dierence (M 1.78 versus M 1.74, SDs
0.67 and 0.83, respectively; see Figure 2, left panel). This means that the overall main
eect for intelligence on expected cooperation is due to the expectations of proselfs,
and not those of prosocials. The interaction between social value orientation and
intelligence on own cooperative behaviour was not significant, F(1, 140)5 1: pro-
socials and proselfs did not dier in the levels of cooperation they displayed toward
intelligent versus unintelligent others. The interaction between social value orientation
and intelligence on global impressions was also not significant; that is, individual
dierences in social value orientation did not influence the way in which participants
formed global impressions of targets diering in intelligence.
Relative benefit
We expected that participants would, overall, expect more cooperation from others
than they would be willing to display themselves, and that this relative benefit would
be largest with moral/unintelligent others. In order to investigate this, we computed
the dierence between levels of cooperation expected and displayed as a measure
of relative benefit. As can be seen in Table 1, we found strong support for our
hypothesis. Overall, participants expected more cooperation from the target than they
Figure 1. Levels of expected and own cooperation for proselfs and prosocials depending on targets’
morality
The double meaning of a single act 175
Copyright # 1999 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Eur. J. Pers. 13: 165–182 (1999)
displayed themselves, F(1, 140) 67.99, p5 0.001. A main eect for morality, F(1,
140) 19.19, p5 0.001, indicated that, overall, relative benefit was greater with
moral than with immoral targets (M 0.48 versus M 0.22, SDs 0.75 and 0.53,
respectively). A main eect for intelligence, F(1, 140) 27.63, p5 0.001, indicated
that, overall, relative benefit was greater with unintelligent than with intelligent
targets (M 0.48 versus M 0.21, SDs 0.73 and 0.46, respectively). These main
eects, however, were qualified by a significant morality and intelligence interaction,
F(1, 140) 29.54, p5 0.001. Consistent with expectations, relative benefit was greater
with moral/unintelligent targets than with any other target type (see Table 1 for
means) 6.
Furthermore, not only characteristics of the perceived, but also those of the
perceiver, influenced relative benefit. The expected main eect of social value orienta-
tion on relative benefit was obtained, F(1, 140) 10.69, p5 0.002: overall, relative
benefit was larger for proselfs than for prosocials (M 0.49 versus M 0.22,
SDs 0.55 and 0.47, respectively). Finally, we found an interaction between social
value orientation and intelligence on relative benefit, F(1, 140) 9.83, p5 0.005).
Although both prosocials and proselfs overall exhibited greater relative benefit with
Figure 2. Levels of expected and own cooperation for proselfs and prosocials depending on targets’
intelligence
6The pattern of the correlations between the dependent variables is congruent with the greater relative
benefit for (especially moral) unintelligent targets, in that cooperative behaviour toward these targets is
related less strongly to expectations and more strongly to global impressions. More specifically,
correlations between expectations and own cooperative behaviour were generally high (and all significant
at p5 0.001), but they were higher for intelligent than for unintelligent targets—0.81 for moral/intelligent
targets, 0.83 for immoral/intelligent targets, 0.56 for moral/unintelligent targets, and 0.63 for immoral/
unintelligent targets. Correlations between global impressions and cooperative behaviour were much lower
overall, but these were lowest for intelligent targets—namely 0.17 for moral/intelligent and immoral/
intelligent targets (both p5 0.05), 0.30 for moral/unintelligent targets (p5 0.001), and 0.22 for immoral/
unintelligent targets (p5 0.01).
Correlations between global impressions and expected cooperation varied from 0.14 to 0.19 (0.18 for
moral/intelligent, 0.14 for immoral/intelligent, 0.19 for immoral/unintelligent, and 0.16 for moral/
unintelligent targets; p5 0.05 for only two of these r values).
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unintelligent than with intelligent targets, this tendency was more pronounced for
proselfs (M 0.72 versus M 0.27, SDs 0.74 and 0.52, respectively) than for
prosocials (M 0.27 versus M 0.16, SDs 0.66 and 0.41, respectively).
DISCUSSION
The present research investigated influences of the perceiver and the perceived on the
way in which perceivers use behaviourial information in forming global evaluative
impressions of the perceived, in deriving expectations regarding levels of cooperation
expected from the perceived, and in deciding on own cooperative or noncooperative
behaviour toward the perceived. We found support for three hypotheses, regarding
(i) the overall importance of morality, (ii) the influence of individual dierences in
social value orientation on the use of behavioural information, and (iii) the increased
relative benefit with interdependent others who are both moral and unintelligent,
especially by people with a proself orientation.
First, consistent with the morality-importance hypothesis, people assign more
weight to the morality aspects of behavioural information than to the intelligence
aspects. Perceivers consider morality to be of greater predictive utility than intel-
ligence: expectations regarding the other’s cooperative or noncooperative behaviour
are based more strongly on a person’s morality than on his or her intelligence. Also,
people base their own cooperative or noncooperative behaviour more strongly on the
other person’s morality than on intelligence. Finally, people’s global evaluative
impressions of the other person are determined more strongly by morality than by
intelligence aspects of the information. As noted before, this overall importance of
morality is most probably due to its clear interpersonal nature. Unlike intelligence,
morality information is, in a relatively straightforward manner, indicative of a
person’s good or bad intentions regarding behaviour toward other people. Therefore,
attending to another person’s morality helps you predict his or her likely behaviour
toward yourself. Another reason for the importance of morality may be that the
meaning of morality information is less ambiguous than the meaning of intelligence.
Whereas a person’s (im)morality directly leads to the conclusion that the person will
act (non)cooperatively, a person’s intelligence can be interpreted as indicative of
either cooperative or noncooperative future behaviour.
Second, as we have seen, this dierential interpretation varies with the perceiver’s
social value orientation. Consistent with the social value orientation hypothesis,
proselfs expect higher levels of cooperation from unintelligent than from intelligent
others, whereas prosocials do not make this dierence. Thus, a person’s own
interpersonal goal determines what kind of behaviour will be considered intelligent,
or rational (i.e. the goal prescribes rationality principle; cf. Van Lange and Liebrand,
1991a). There is no direct relationship between perceived intelligence and self-interest;
that is, such a relationship only exists for proselfs, but not for prosocials. This is
clearly at variance with traditional theorizing in game theory and economic theory
(cf. Luce and Raia, 1957; Roth, 1988), in which the pursuit of immediate self-interest
was viewed as the rational option—for everybody.
Although proselfs expect higher levels of cooperation from unintelligent than from
intelligent people, they do not dier in the levels of cooperation they display toward
intelligent versus unintelligent people. The finding that proselfs are not likely to
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reciprocate high levels of expected cooperation is also consistent with prior research.
Indeed, proselfs are generally less likely than prosocials to base their own behaviour
on the levels of cooperation they expect from others (see e.g. De Dreu and McCusker,
1997; Van Lange et al., 1997a).
Also consistent with the social value orientation hypothesis is the finding that
prosocials assign more weight to morality aspects of the information. Whereas both
prosocials and proselfs display more cooperation toward moral than toward immoral
targets, this dierence is much more pronounced for prosocials. Interestingly,
prosocials and proselfs did not dier in levels of cooperation expected from moral
versus immoral others. So, even though people with prosocial and proself value
orientations expect similar levels of cooperation from others based on morality
information, they still dier in the extent to which they are willing to reciprocate this
expected cooperation. Prosocials base their own level of cooperative behaviour more
on the other’s morality than proselfs. In sum, these results provide evidence in favour
of our assumption that multi-interpretable information leaves room for perceivers
to (implicitly) decide what aspects of the information they will give most weight
(cf. Bruner, 1957).
Our third, and more exploratory relative benefit hypothesis pertained to the
dierence between levels of cooperation expected from and displayed toward the
other person. As predicted, people overall expect higher levels of cooperation than
they are willing to display themselves, and this dierence is especially pronounced
with moral/unintelligent others. Furthermore, we found the perceiver’s social value
orientation to influence relative benefit in two respects. First, the dierence between
expected and own cooperation appeared to be much more pronounced overall for
proselfs than for prosocials. This is congruent with the notion described earlier, that
prosocials are more likely than proselfs to base their own behaviour on the expected
behaviour from others, and to reciprocate these levels of expected cooperation.
Second, the finding that relative benefit is largest for moral/unintelligent others was
due to the high level of cooperation expected from these persons, and not to low levels
of cooperation displayed toward them. As we saw earlier, only proselfs, and not
prosocials, expect more cooperation from unintelligent than from intelligent others.
So, proselfs are primarily responsible for the large relative benefit with moral/
unintelligent others.
A MODEL DESCRIBING INFLUENCES OF PERCEIVER AND PERCEIVED
IN COOPERATIVE INTERACTIONS
In determining to what extent a perceiver will display cooperative or noncooperative
behaviour toward a person perceived, attributes of both the perceived and the
perceiver play a role. Based on the above results, we propose the following model
describing how the perceiver, when confronted with behavioural information
indicative of another person’s morality and intelligence, decides on own cooperative
behaviour. This model is congruent with other studies describing how morality and
intelligence of the perceived and the social value orientation of the perceiver lead
to cooperative or noncooperative behaviour (e.g. Van Lange and Liebrand, 1989;
1991a; b). Of course, this model is preliminary in several respects, and needs further
research to validate or invalidate its claims.
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A perceiver probably first attends to informational aspects regarding the morality
of the perceived, and uses these in deriving expectations about this person’s likely
behaviour. If the other person is perceived as rather moral, high levels of cooperation
are expected, and the situation becomes one in which the perceiver can look for ways
to maximize his or her gains. On the other hand, if the person is perceived as rather
immoral, low levels of cooperation are expected, and the situation becomes one in
which the perceiver has to look for ways to minimize his or her losses.
In this latter case, the impact of information that the other is immoral will be so
strong that neither the intelligence of the perceived, nor the social value orientation of
the perceiver will play a role any further (for evidence concerning the large impact of
negative morality information, see e.g. Reeder and Coovert, 1986). The perceiver
expects and displays low levels of cooperation. Exactly how low these levels are will
depend on the perceiver’s social value orientation. If, on the other hand, the other
person is perceived as moral, other attributes of the perceiver and the perceived can
play a role—partly, maybe, because positive morality information is consistent with
social norms, and therefore not very informative (Jones and Davis, 1965). However,
this will only be the case for perceivers with a proself value orientation. Prosocials will
not attend to intelligence aspects when morality aspects are also present (Van Lange
and Kuhlman, 1994); and when this morality information is positive, they will expect
and display high levels of cooperation. Proselfs, on the other hand, do use intelligence
information in deriving expectations. If the other is perceived as unintelligent, proselfs
will expect higher levels of cooperation than when the other person is intelligent.
In both cases, however, the proself perceiver will display similar levels of cooperation
toward the perceived, so that the result is larger relative benefit with moral/
unintelligent than moral/intelligent others.
In sum, if the person described in the introduction were hired in our department, we
would all first attend to her moral nature, which would determine our impressions of
her. Prosocials among us would attend to her morality only. They would expect
relatively high levels of cooperation from her, and be willing to reciprocate these to
some extent (but not completely). Proselfs among us would also attend strongly to her
being incompetent. Hence, they would expect her to be extremely cooperative, but
they would not be inclined to reciprocate.
STRENGTHS AND LIMITATIONS
We would like to close by pointing out some of the strengths and limitations of
this research. First, one of the strengths of this research is that we used behavioural
descriptions that were not designed to be informative of only one dimension, but
captured aspects of the two most important dimensions in impression formation—
social and intellectual desirability. This multi-faceted nature of behavioural informa-
tion has largely been neglected in impression formation research. We contend that its
openness to interpretation is one of the most important aspects of behavioural
information, in that it allows for dierent interpretations by dierent people. This
phenomenon will at least in part be responsible for the diversity and complexity of
impressions made in everyday life situations.
Another strength of this study is that it investigates impression formation in an
interaction context, in which perceivers and targets aremutually dependent and able to
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choose between behavioural options that have consequences for all persons involved.
Although we realize that we used only one specific type of situation in this study
(which, in fact, is true of most laboratory experiments in personality and social psy-
chology), we think that this method is appropriate for studying basic human motiva-
tions in such situations. Also, we think this type of study may be viewed as a starting
point for investigating more diverse and more realistic settings in the near future.
We are aware of the fact that we must regard the above results as somewhat
preliminary, as they are based on only two behavioural descriptions per target
category. That is, the descriptions may have contained idiosyncratic characteristics
that have influenced the results in unforeseen ways. Even then, however, it is impor-
tant to note that most of our results are consistent with hypotheses. The readiness
with which people derive such diverse global evaluative impressions, and such diverse
conclusions about other’s and own behaviour, from mere behavioural descriptions
provides strong evidence for the powerful informational value of human behaviour in
guiding impression formation and social interaction.
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APPENDIX. THE BEHAVIOURAL DESCRIPTIONS
USED IN THE STUDY
In order to invest his savings, he chose funds that invested in good causes and that
would cause him little risk (moral/intelligent).
When two of his friends had not been on speaking terms for about a month, he
helped them realize how childish their fight was (moral/intelligent).
He was being very kind to a person he did not like, because this person could help
him in his career (immoral/intelligent).
He filled out his tax forms in such a way that he received back more money than he
had a right to (immoral/intelligent).
When he heard that the birds did not have enough drinking water because of the
cold, he put a saucer of water outside, which froze immediately (moral/unintelligent).
Again and again, he worked overtime, although his boss did not pay him any extras
and it did not benefit his career prospects (moral/unintelligent).
Right in front of the referee, he brought down his opponent in a really dirty way
(immoral/unintelligent).
On the declaration forms for a course he had followed, he also wrote down petrol
costs, although his boss knew that he did not own a car (immoral/unintelligent).
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